On June 21, 2025, the U.S. Air Force executed a raid on Iran’s Fordo nuclear site, dropping a dozen 30,000-pound (13,607 kilograms) ground-penetrating bombs. This offensive was specifically aimed at the uranium enrichment facility, which is strategically located deep within a mountain. Following the attack, President Donald Trump asserted that the target was “completely and totally obliterated.”
However, this definitive claim has met with skepticism. On June 24, the administration cancelled a planned classified intelligence briefing for members of Congress, a move that fueled frustration among those seeking clarity on the White House's declarations. While analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) seemingly concur that the strikes inflicted substantial damage, they challenge the notion that Iran's enrichment capability has been permanently eliminated. Early reports from their analysis suggest that the strikes may have only set back Iran's program by a few months.
Such discrepancies are not uncommon in the realm of battle damage assessment (BDA), historically known as bomb damage assessment. This process is notoriously challenging, and past conflicts have been marked by sharp disagreements among military and intelligence professionals. During World War II, factors such as adverse weather conditions and technological limitations significantly hampered the accuracy of these assessments. Decades later, despite remarkable advancements in surveillance technology, BDA has remained a complex issue. A prime example is the first Gulf War in 1990, where military leaders and CIA officials found themselves at odds over the true impact of airstrikes on Iraq's armored forces.
As a scholar of international relations specializing in intelligence and strategy within international conflicts, and the author of “Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence,” I understand from historical precedents that overcoming the complexities of battle damage assessment is particularly arduous when dealing with targets like Fordo, which are concealed under hundreds of feet of earth and rock.
The intelligence community employs a range of tools and techniques to address challenges such as assessing the damage at Fordo. Imagery intelligence, particularly satellite photography, serves as a fundamental starting point. "Before-and-after comparisons" can unveil features like collapsed tunnels or alterations in topography, which may indicate undetected subterranean damage.
More advanced data collection methods, known as measurement and signatures intelligence, can aid in inferring underground effects based on particle and electromagnetic emissions from the site. Specialized sensors are capable of measuring nuclear radiation, seismographic data, and other potentially revealing information from concealed facilities. When integrated with conventional imagery, measurement and signatures intelligence can construct a more comprehensive model of the likely consequences of the bombing.
Other intelligence sources also offer valuable insights. Reports from human intelligence assets—spies or unwitting informants with direct or indirect knowledge—can provide crucial information on Iran's internal assessments. These sources are especially valuable, as Iranian officials are presumably aware of any equipment removed prior to the attack, as well as the location of previously enriched uranium. Similarly, signals intelligence, which involves intercepting and interpreting communications, can contribute significantly. Ideally, battle damage assessment becomes more exhaustive and precise as these diverse intelligence sources are harmonized into a unified evaluation.
Despite these sophisticated tools, estimating the broader, long-term effects on Iran's nuclear program remains profoundly difficult due to pervasive uncertainty. While measuring the immediate physical damage to Fordo and other nuclear sites can be viewed as a "puzzle"—a problem solvable with sufficient evidence—forecasting the long-term impact on Iranian policy is a "mystery"—a problem that may not be resolved even with ample information. It is inherently impossible to predict how Iran’s leaders will adapt to evolving circumstances, as their perceptions of the future are intrinsically uncertain.
Regarding the "puzzle" of Fordo, President Trump appears convinced that the sheer volume of explosives used guarantees success. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt echoed this sentiment, stating: “Everyone knows what happens when you drop 14 30,000-pound bombs perfectly on their targets: total obliteration.” However, the fact that Fordo is embedded deep within a mountain casts doubt on this straightforward conclusion. Furthermore, Iran might have preemptively relocated enriched uranium and specialized equipment from the site, thereby mitigating the attack's effects on its nuclear program. Both Trump's intuition and the skeptics' claims possess plausibility. Analysts will require more intelligence from a wider array of sources to arrive at a confident judgment regarding the impact on Fordo and Iran's broader nuclear endeavors. Even then, disagreements over the effects are likely, as such assessments necessitate making predictions.
In an ideal scenario, policymakers and intelligence officials would engage in good-faith deliberations over conflicting assessments, a process insulated from political pressures, allowing for criticism without accusations of political maneuvering. In this idealized setting, policymakers could rely on sound intelligence conclusions to guide their decision-making, particularly concerning the numerous critical security decisions in the Middle East that still need to be made.
However, we do not operate in an ideal world, and the hope for such a good-faith debate appears regrettably naive. Battle lines are already being drawn. Congressional Democrats harbor suspicions that the administration is being disingenuous about Iran, while the White House has adopted an offensive stance. Leavitt, in a written statement, declared: “The leaking of this alleged assessment is a clear attempt to demean President Trump and discredit the brave fighter pilots who conducted a perfectly executed mission.”
The relationship between policymakers and their intelligence advisors is frequently contentious, and U.S. presidents have a long history of disagreements with intelligence chiefs. Nevertheless, intelligence-policy relations today are in a particularly dire state. President Trump bears significant responsibility, given his repeated disparagement of intelligence officials. For instance, he dismissed congressional testimony on Iran from Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, stating: “I don’t care what she said.”
Yet, the problem extends beyond the president. Intelligence-policy relations in a democracy are inherently challenging due to the persuasive power of classified information. Policymakers fear that intelligence officials, who control secrets, might use them to undermine their plans. Conversely, intelligence officials worry that policymakers will coerce them into providing politically convenient answers. Such mutual fears have historically led to intelligence-policy breakdowns, as seen in assessments of enemy strength during the Vietnam War and estimates of Soviet missile capabilities in the early years of détente.
This mutual suspicion has intensified since the end of the Cold War, as secret intelligence has become increasingly public. Intelligence leaders are now recognizable public figures, and intelligence judgments on current issues are frequently declassified rapidly. The public's expectation of access to intelligence findings has contributed to intelligence becoming a political football.
What does this mean for intelligence concerning Iran? Trump might disregard assessments he dislikes, consistent with his past interactions with intelligence. However, the acrimonious public dispute over the Fordo strike may prompt the White House to pressure intelligence leaders to conform, especially if critics demand a public accounting of classified intelligence. Such an outcome would be detrimental to all parties involved. The public would remain ill-informed about the complexities of Iran's nuclear efforts, the intelligence community's reputation would suffer a severe blow, and the administration's attempts to leverage intelligence publicly might backfire, as was the case for the George W. Bush administration after the war in Iraq. Just as with military campaigns, instances of politicizing intelligence often have lasting and sometimes unforeseen consequences.
